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Racial Party Polarization Under Donald Trump
Abstract
Growing party polarization directly results from increasing economic inequalities, racial tensions and the
idea that the white majority is now a minority. This paper identifies the sources of party polarization.
Combining social, economic, and racial factors, it builds on popular scholarly works that show white
people feel left behind. Acknowledging that income inequality is the root of polarization, the paper argues
that the interaction between race, economics and social status provides a more well-rounded look at
party polarization. Party polarization has caused an increase in non-college-educated people participating
in voting. This, in turn, led to Donald Trump’s popularity. This study pulls from exit polls from the last three
US Presidential elections to conduct an extensive statistical analysis. The study also uses polling from
Gallup and United States Federal Reserve Board’s 2020 Survey of Household Economics and Decision
Making (SHED). Findings reveal that people are voting more conservatively based on education and
income. These findings indicate that party polarization is on the rise due to a divide in income and
education but not on the basis of race.
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Racial Party Polarization Under Donald Trump
Kate Berman
Abstract
Growing party polarization directly results from increasing economic inequalities, racial
tensions and the idea that the white majority is now a minority. This paper identifies the sources
of party polarization. Combining social, economic, and racial factors, it builds on popular
scholarly works that show white people feel left behind. Acknowledging that income inequality is
the root of polarization, the paper argues that the interaction between race, economics and
social status provides a more well-rounded look at party polarization. Party polarization has
caused an increase in non-college-educated people participating in voting. This, in turn, led to
Donald Trump’s popularity. This study pulls from exit polls from the last three US Presidential
elections to conduct an extensive statistical analysis. The study also uses polling from Gallup
and United States Federal Reserve Board’s 2020 Survey of Household Economics and Decision
Making (SHED). Findings reveal that people are voting more conservatively based on education
and income. These findings indicate that party polarization is on the rise due to a divide in
income and education but not on the basis of race.
Introduction
‘A house divided against itself cannot stand."-Abraham Lincoln
The process of political polarization is, at its core, a divisive one. It is centered around the
ideas of racism, a growing white minority, and the “feeling of being left behind.” Polarization
creates an in-group and an outgroup, both of whom feel their ideas are correct. Polarization, at its
core, is differences in ideological basis between the Democratic and Republican parties.
Polarization causes a divide in the ideological spectrum, which classifies party positions and
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ideas about one another. President Trump has taken advantage of party polarization and used it
for his benefit.
Party polarization appeals most to those who have felt left behind and who struggle to
accept a changing America. Capturing this feeling, party leaders, such as Trump, can quickly
gain the trust and support of their following.Thus, some scholars have claimed that party
polarization is nothing new but Trump brought out these feelings. The rise of party polarization
contributes greatly to the need to be heard for marginalized groups.
This study will focus on how polarization has risen over the last three presidential
elections. These elections are 2012, 2016, and 2020. This, in turn, will answer the question:
What factors led to increased party polarization under the Trump administration?
Literature Review
Party polarization has been a long-standing issue in American democracy that increased
under the Trump administration. Several scholars have varying opinions on what caused this
polarization. Bittner (2021) and Abramowitz and McCoy (2019) argue that the change in social
basis is critical to this polarization. Social basis can be defined as the people supporting the
party. Religion, economic standing, education and race can all determine one's social basis. On
the other hand, Polacko and Heath (2021) argue that income inequality is critical to this
polarization and is the root of it. Inglehart and Weltz (2005) argue that there are four reasons for
the link between institutions and values. Scholars Schaffner et al. (2018) have a similar argument
as the other authors and argue that white dominance, increased racial tensions, and a growing
minority class is critical to increased polarization. Fried and Harris (2020) argue that the Trump
administration, as a whole, decreased trust in democracy. Lui (2020) takes an entirely different
approach from the other scholars and argues that religion is the basis of this polarization. These
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theories are critical to understanding how polarization has increased under the Trump
administration.
Bittner (2021) brought up the theory that change in social basis has led to increased
polarization. She uses cross-national longitudinal analysis from five countries to show that
leaders are more important today than ever before. Under her research, she argues that
partisanship in the United States is increasing, and people in the center are moving more toward
the party that they align most with. Due to people moving away from the center, polarization has
increased at a rapid rate. Scholars may argue that this movement from the center is a direct result
of millennials who “hate everything”. However, this is not a correct view, and millennials appear
to be more engaged than in previous elections. According to Pew Research, “Millennials and
Gen X together cast 21.9 million more votes in 2018 than in 2014. By comparison, the number of
votes cast by Boomers and older generations increased by 3.6 million. (Pew Research,2018)”
Millennials and Gen X are more engaged than previous generations, thus arguing that millennials
are not politically is engaged false.
She also argues that personalization, the idea that the personality of the person running
for office matters, is mainly due to individualization, emphasis on candidates in the media,
increased prominence of leaders, and changes in party organization (Bittner, 2021). Bittner
writes, “The emerging literature has noted the factors motivating the decision-making process of
voters has shifted over time, as voters note that the “man” is having an increased influence on
their vote choice than “the party” (Bittner, 2021, pg. 3). Thus, Bittner claims that personalization
has become an important factor when selecting a candidate. People want someone they feel like
they can relate to (Bittner, 2021, pg. 4). Individualization is the argument that people value what
is best for them as an individual when voting (Bittner, 2021, pg. 4).
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The author, Amanda Bittner, makes use of several graphs in her argument. In one
particular figure, which shows the leader's competence, character, and thermometer ratings
across all five countries being studied, the line clearly fluctuates. No line is straight, and no line
is identical. She argues that “Even in situations where the same leader contests more than a
single election in a country, we see fluctuations, indicating that voters perceive the leader
differently over time” (Bittner, 2021, pg. 7). This can be especially true with President Trump as
people viewed him differently in each election. This fluctuation can be seen in the data analyzed
later in the paper. Bittner’s argument that people view leaders differently due to personalization
is true in the case of President Trump.
Due to the importance of individualization and people viewing leaders differently each
cycle, the change in social basis has led to the personalization of candidates. Additionally,
because people are moving away from the political center, polarization has increased rapidly.
Abramowitz and McCoy (2021) argue a similar argument as Bittner with a few slight
differences. Abramowitz and McCoy argue that while President Trump’s victory was shocking
to many, it was a sign of deep division in the nation. The authors argue that due to voter shifts
since the early 1970s and 1980s, increased party polarization has occurred due to voters finding a
party they agree most with. Abramowitz and McCoy argue that this divide has become more
apparent following the election of President Obama. After President Obama was elected, a new
group of minority voters could be heard. The empowerment of this group reinforced a sense of
loss felt by white, working-class voters in the next election. This sense of loss by white people
was due to their social status being challenged. President Trump acknowledged their emotions,
and as a result, Trump was able to capture several key states where white, working-class voters
are the majority of the population, fueling his victory in 2016. These states were not only
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captured due to one's social standing but also due to racial resentment. Trump was able to
capture and appeal to white racial resentment and ethnonationalism. Abramowitz and McCoy
argue that Trump was able to exploit people’s weaknesses to win the election and that Trump is
just a microcosm of a much larger issue.
On the other hand, Polacko et al. (2019) argue that the change in social basis is not the
reason for polarization. The reasons for polarization are due to a change in income inequality,
and thus, polarization has increased. Income inequality directly results from a failed trickle-down
economic theory that has persisted for generations.
Inglehart and Weltz (2005) make four particular cases about the rise in the lack of
democratic institutions. They argue about the civil and political rights that formally define
democracy. The congruent thesis is that institutionalization of civil and political liberties is
needed for democracy. However, they are not the only things that define it, and the discrepancy
between formal and effective democracies. They define democracy as “liberties that empower
individuals” (Inglehart and Weltz, 2005, p. 175). These liberties define and shape one's life. The
liberties include voting and political suffrage, but they are much more than that alone. They
measure this in terms of self-expression and socioeconomic development. Inglehart and Weltz
argue that self-expression causes democracy (Inglehart, 2005, p. 186). The congruent theory
argues that the institution of democracy must be consistent with the values of the citizens.
Otherwise the institution will not be viewed as legitimate. Because of this, self-expression is
critical to forming and maintaining a democracy. Without self-expression, citizens are not able to
have an institution that properly reflects them. Officeholders should not deprive citizens of the
ability to have self-expression. These abilities must be carried out both on paper and through the
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state. Trump was able to rise into power. He acknowledged the inability of self-expression and
used it to fuel his campaign.
Schaffner et al. (2018) argue that racism and sexism are leading causes of democratic
polarization. In 2016, the issues of racism and sexism were at the forefront of the election.
During this period, white people felt increasingly threatened by feeling left behind during
economic recovery. Trump was able to appeal to voters through racist and sexist comments The
authors argue that the gap between college and non-college-educated was nearly 18 points during
this period. The points are in reference to the electoral college points that each state is
given. This was the most significant gap in the election cycle. Lui (2020) makes a very different
and interesting argument compared to the other scholars mentioned throughout this literature
review. Lui argues that religion was the key element in increased polarization during the 2016
election. He uses quotes and readings from other scholars to highlight this point. He believes that
America was already deeply polarized prior to the election of Trump. Lui writes,” Political
polarization has formed two opposing national identities, each holding the other as an unpatriotic
betrayal of the nation’s heritage and a threat to its future” (Lui, 2020, p. 1). Within this quote,
Lui makes it clear that polarization is not new. The nation is deeply polarized on policies
between parties and what each party represents. As a result of these differences, it is hard to
create a middle ground in the United States. However, President Trump exacerbated this issue.
Lui compares examples from the American Jeremiad to party polarization within the United
States. Under President Trump, party polarization in the United States was rooted in American
exceptionalism Lui believes. The first element to the Jeremiad is an assumed special relationship
that makes their society different from others (Liu, 2020 p. 1). The second is a cause-and-effect
relationship between faith and societal flourishing (Lui, 2020, p. 1). This assumes that blessings
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and curses were a part of a national covenant. Lui argues that both of these can be seen in Trump
as he lamented the harsh relations of the present by refusing to do anything to solve the ongoing
pandemic and by believing that he won the 2020 election. Trump also believes that he is
exceptional, which has led to the creation of his version of American exceptionalism (Lui, 2020,
p. 9).
Fried and Harris (2020) make a critical argument. They use examples from Twitter and
other news sources to claim that during the 2020 election, both sides worked to cultivate public
distrust. President Trump pushed strategies of distrust that were already in place by the
republican party to a new level. He challenged the legitimacy of the FBI and elections. This was
mainly done in fraud claims and claims that the election was rigged. President Trump himself led
these claims. President Trump used Twitter and other social media to validate the legitimacy of
the government long before he was president. Some examples of these claims can be traced back
to early in his campaign for the 2016 election when he claimed that President Obama was not
born in the US and claimed that Ted Cruz stole the election when he lost the Iowa caucuses
(Fried, 2020, p. 7). Fried and Harris state, “As November 2018 approached and Democrats
seemed to be headed towards a midterm victory, Trump claimed that a caravan of illegal
immigrants was heading towards the US”(Fried & Harris, 2020, p 3). Trump was able to create
distractions during the election cycles, which caused people to be less likely to vote for
democrats or in the election itself. People worried about illegal immigrants or claims of voter
fraud may be less incentivized to vote because they are distracted or believe that the election is
being rigged.
In the 2020 election, Trump did not stop with the claims of a weakened democracy. His
election-related tweets often involved discredited polls, voting processes, and election outcomes
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(Fried & Harris, 2020, p. 4). Trump often claimed that democrats would rig the 2020 election.
The president, Donald Trump, worked to weaken trust in democracy through his tweets and in
his news conferences. President Trump continued to attack the legitimacy of democracy by
claiming that vote-by-mail ballots were fraudulent and harming the postal services (Fried, 2020,
p. 5). President Trump influenced his supporters with these claims, which caused them to be less
likely to accept the election outcome.
President Trump was able to gather distrust due to a weakened public view of democracy
through tweets and news interviews. This distrust began as early as the 2016 election cycle and
lasted until the election outcome was deemed legitimate by the electoral college. The effects of
this distrust may be seen for decades to come.
In order to have a complete understanding of party polarization, this research builds on
works done by Abramowitz and McCoy (2021) and Bittner’s (2021) idea of racism and
economics as the causes of party polarization. This research adds the variables of race,
education, and economic status. The research also shows exactly how people feel not heard by
the government, which earlier authors failed to show. This paper focuses on race and economic
factors that led to increased party polarization. The hypothesis argues that due to white people’s
expectations of the government not being met because of economic, social, and racial tensions,
party polarization caused an increase in non-college-educated people participating in voting
which led to Trump’s popularity.
Research Design
This paper will use exit polling data from the past three presidential elections. The
analysis produced will be generalizable and account for party polarization across the United
States by using exit polling data. Since the sample size varies in each poll, the individual
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conditions of each poll are not controlled for. The survey size in 2012 exit polls was based on
voters in 350 randomly chosen precincts across the United States and includes absentee voters
and early voters interviewed by telephone. In 2016, exit poll data was based on questionnaires
completed by 24,537 voters, leaving 350 voting places throughout the United States on Election
Day, including 4,398 telephone interviews with early and absentee voters. In 2020, exit poll data
was based on interviews with 15,590 voters.
The study used data from Gallup, taken in 2021. Gallup results are based on telephone
interviews conducted January 4-15, 2021 with a random sample of 1,023adults, ages 18+, living
in all 50 U.S. states and the District of Columbia. This study also used data from the United
States Federal Reserve Board’s 2020 Survey of Household Economics and Decisionmaking
(SHED). There were 11,713 people that completed the survey.
The dependent variable is party polarization. This will be operationalized as support for
democratic or republican party candidates. The independent variable is race. The second
independent variable is income. This will be operationally defined as people’s feelings about the
thought of being left behind due to a widening economic gap. The third independent variable is
education. This will be operationally defined as college or non-college educated. Other possible
independent variables include gender, age, urban or rural location, and religion.
Findings and Analysis
This study used graphs made on excel to help establish data analytics. In each graph, red
represents republican voters, and blue is the percentage of voters who are democrats.
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Figure 1
Voting based on race from 2012 to 2020

In figure one, race was measured across three presidential elections. As seen in the
graphs, white people tend to constantly have the same trends across all three elections. There is
very little change among whites voting for democrat and republican for white people. For people
who are black, the percentage of those voting democrat and republican in 2012 to 2016 remains
constant. However, when looking at black voters and the change from 2016 to 2020, there was a
four percent increase in those voting republican. Black people voting democrat between 2016
and 2020 remained stable, but this was not the case for those voting republican. Things remained
the same for Hispanic voters between the 2012 and 2016 elections. However, like black voters,
Hispanic had an upsurge in those voting republican in 2020. The Hispanic voters going for
republicans in 2020 increased by three percent points from 2016. This data is significant because
it argues against the hypothesis that was made in the paper. Democrats experienced a gain
amongst white voters from 2016 to 2020. This data is critical to the understanding of voting
patterns based on race.
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Figure 2
Voting based on income from 2012 to 2020

In figure two, income was measured across the same three elections. Four ranges of
income were measured. All experienced a significant gain or decrease in voting percentage
between election cycles. From 2012 to 2016, the following areas experienced a loss of voters:
democrats in the $30,000 to $49,999 bracket, republicans in the $50,000 or more and republicans
in $100,000 or more brackets. The other two areas remained stable across the two elections.
When comparing 2016 to 2020, democrats in the $50,000 or more category experienced the
largest gain, eleven percentage points. In the $30,000 or under category, democrats remained
stable from 2016 while republicans again experienced a five percent increase. In the $100,000 or
more category, both the democrats and the republicans experienced gains. Democrats
experienced a six percent increase while republicans experienced a nine percent increase. In the
$39,999 to $49,999 bracket, democrats were able to rebound from their 2016 losses and have a
five percent increase in the 2020 election. The other income brackets remained stable. This data
is consistent with the hypothesis made in the paper earlier. Democrats are experiencing a loss of
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lower-income voters. At the same time, they are experiencing a rise in upper-class voters.
Republicans, at the same time, are experiencing gains with lower-income voters while remaining
stable with middle-income voters. The data is consistent with the hypothesis.

Figure 3
Voting based on education from 2012 to 2020

In figure three, education is measured across the last three elections. Four areas of
education were measured. Almost all areas experienced either an increase or decrease in the
percentage of votes. From 2012- to 2016, three areas experienced a six percent decrease in votes.
These areas are no college-educated democrats, some college-educated democrats, and collegeeducated Republicans. Postgraduate republicans experienced the second-highest loss, which was
five percent of the vote. No college-educated republicans and some college-educated republicans
experienced a four percent increase from 2012 to 2016. College-educated democrats and
postgraduate democrats also experienced an increase in voters in that same period. From 2016 to
2020, the area that experienced the greatest increase in voter turnout was some college-educated
democrats. This gain was an eight percent increase. The area that had the greatest loss in that
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time was some-college-educated republicans, which was a five percent loss. All other categories
experienced smaller gains or remained stable from 2016 to 2020. The data based on education
and party vote support the hypothesis. Less college-educated people tend to vote more
republican.
Figure 4
Americans’ Satisfaction with Life

Now, this paper will show exactly how people are feeling heard by the government.
Using data taken from Gallup, the graph below shows how satisfied Americans are with seven
areas of life. These areas include quality of life in the country, the opportunity to get ahead via
hard work, the influence of religion, the size and power of the federal government, the system of
government and how it works, the size and influence of corporations, and the moral and ethical
climate. This data was taken from 2001 to 2021. Overall, people are satisfied with life in the
United States. Satisfaction from 2012 to 2019 hovered around 47 %. In 2020, satisfaction
reached 53%, the highest since 2007. Figure four thus proves that overall, people are satisfied
with their government. While Americans' satisfaction is generally less than 50%, people are
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satisfied with the government. This data helps to show that party polarization is not due to
people’s overall unhappiness with the government.

Figure 5
Americans who are financially stable

Figure five uses data from the 2020 Survey of Household Economics and Decision
making (SHED) done by the US Federal Reserve. The data shows how people are doing
financially by year from 2013 to 2021. Financial stability factors included income, employment,
ability to deal with unplanned expenses, credit, housing, education, student loans and retirement.
Since 2013, the percentage of people doing financially stable has steadily increased. At the start
of the pandemic, people felt less financially secure. This is likely due to the loss of jobs, overall
uncertainty, increased racial tensions, and much more. Since then, people’s economic standings
have improved. This data helps to show that, to a certain extent, financial stability is not why
people do not feel heard by the government. This data disproves the hypothesis, showing that
economic stability is not a direct reason for party polarization.

RES PUBLICA XXVII | 42
The paper hypothesizes that due to white people’s expectations of the government not
being met because of economic, social, and racial tensions, party polarization caused an increase
in non-college-educated people voting for President Trump. This hypothesis was found to be
proven correct on the basis of education and economics. Race was not an indicator of party
polarization. As a whole, people’s expectations of the government are being met.
Conclusion
Traditional theories of party polarization use race, economic distrust, and cultural
grievances to measure party polarization. By developing off of this thesis, this study has
introduced more nuance into the conversation of party polarization. Using exit polls, polls from
Gallup, and the 2020 SHED, this study shows that white people are not voting more republican
based purely on the characterization of race. Poorer people are voting more towards the
republican party, which helps to confirm the hypothesis that poor people lean more toward the
republican party. Also, non-college-educated voters are voting less democratic. Using polls from
Gallup and the 2020 SHED, people feel that the government is meeting their expectations. This
allows us to accept the hypothesis that non-college-educated people feel left behind. However,
the paper does not prove the idea that white people, in particular, feel left behind. The paper
lacked the necessary data to prove this argument. The data based on race was limited due to
being unable to find data that supported this.
This study presents a few intriguing areas for future research. In the future, it would be
useful to control gender. This would help capture more nuances based on gender that cannot be
expressed otherwise. The study also needs data on combining race and if people feel left behind,
which was central to the hypothesis. This study could also be applied to other countries to help
capture feelings of party polarization. Also, it could be possible to expand this study once the
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2024 presidential election has occurred. This will better help understand if party polarization has
increased in the years following Donald Trump.
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